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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the various theoretical 
issues in regulation with a view to enhancing 
understanding cif the regulation arena. Special 
emphasis has been placed otl the bar1king indus-
try. The paper shows how regulation serves dif-
ferent purposes for different iHterest groups on 
differem occasions. It further argues that because 
of the ever shifting concept of 'public good', 
shifting individual and group interest and, per-
haps the entwit1ement of individual and public 
good, ~1either the captllre theory or the public 
good theory has yet }illly explained the ratio-
nale for regulation. A clear understmzdin:< of the 
theoretical issues involved in regulation is there-
fore important il the forces that drive regulation 
are to be appreciated jitlly. 
Regulation generally suggests some form 
of intervention in any activity, and ranges 
from explicit legal control to informal 
peer group control by government or 
some such authoritative body. 1 Regulation 
sometimes stems from market failure, 
which usually occurs when market transac-
tions give rise to spillover effects (or 
externalities) on third parties, or when 
there is information inefficiency in the 
market. 2 Some forms of regulatiou, how-
ever, tend to be paternalistic in nature, 
often overriding the individual's right to 
choose, even when such an individual has 
all the relevant information available to 
him _3 For instance, it is common practice 
for people to be prevented by law from 
driving a motor vehicle without putting 
on their safety belts or working under a 
contract of employment without contri-
buting to a pension scheme. But paterna-
listic regulation is sometimes entwined 
with regulation on grounds of public 
interest. For instance, the failure to wear a 
safety belt, when driving a car, may give 
rise to medical costs, which are borne by 
the taxpayers via the National Health Ser-
vice Scheme. The taxpayer thus has an 
interest in reducing such costs and paterna-
listic regulation is one way of achieving 
this. 
Taxpayers may also have to come to the 
rescue when the individual is left indigent 
as a result of unwise fmancial decisions 
such as a reluctance to save for years when 
paid employment is no longer feasible. The 
end point of all regulatory proces,es is the 
enshrinement of some code of conduct for 
the regulated activity. Whatever rules are 
finally agreed they usually have diverse 
consequences for various interest groups. 
This has made the regulatory process -
ranging over how such regulation is pro-
posed, fqrmally considered and approved, 
administered, interpreted, evaluated and 
altered·- a political activity. 4 
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The aim of this paper is to examine the 
various theoretical issues in regulation with 
a view to enhancing understanding of the 
conceptual issues in the regulation arena. 
The emphasis is on the banking industry. 
To achieve its aim, the paper is divided 
into four parts. The first part discusses the 
two main theories of regulation while the 
second examines alternative styles of regu-
lation. The third part discusses the special 
nature of the banking trade, which further 
impacts on its regulation, while the fourth 
concludes the paper. 
THEORIES OF REGULATION 
Two mam conflicting theories have 
evolved over time in the attempt to explain 
both the origins and practice of regulation: 
public interest and capture theories. The 
public interest theory holds that regulation 
is supplied in response to the demand of the 
public for the correction of inefficient or 
inequitable market practices.~ It is therefore 
not surprising that until the late 1960s, 
most economists regarded the growth of 
regulation as an attempt by government to 
improve upon the allocation of resources 
which would otherwise occur in unregu-
lated markets. This belief was based on the 
implicit assumption that some forms of 
activities, business or otherwise, do not 
always function in the public interest with-
out supervision or control. This view has a 
historical antecedent: regulation in the past 
(and even today) had almost always fol-
lowed some form of crisis or public dissent. 
It was, for instance, the protest of the popu-
list farmers against the exploitative rates 
levied by railroads that led to the creation 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
the USA.r' The establishment of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission is yet 
another example of a crisis driven regula-
tion. 7 The Food and Drug Act of 1938 in 
the USA was passed following a drug acci-
dent.K The 1962 Drugs Amendments Act, 
also in the USA, was passed shortly after 
the Thalidomide incident, even though the 
bill had languished in committee hearings 
for years.'1 Examples of crisis-inspired legis-
lation 111 the UK include the Royal 
Exchange and London Assurance Corpora-
tions Act (Bubble Act) of 1719. This Act, 
which outlawed the joint stock companies 
of the time, vvas a direct consequence of the 
widespread abuse of the system, mainly in 
the form of fraudulent promotion of such 
companies, culminating in the famous 
South Sea Company Scandal. 1' 1 Likewise, 
the 1956 Clean Air Act, was a direct conse-
quence of the London 'killer smog' of 
1952. 11 
An implicit assumption of the public 
interest theory is that regulation is, in the 
main, aimed at protecting the public. To 
achieve its aim, regulation based on the 
above principle should aim at equipping 
the public with all relevant information 
necessary for decision making. Regulation 
in the public interest should also strive to 
protect the public from monopolies and 
industries that generate substantial external 
costs or benefits. This docs not always 
h . . P F h appen m pract1ce. - urt ermore, were 
this theory right, one should also expect no 
support for regulation from regulatees. 11 
This has not always been the case. In the 
USA, for instance, the railroads supported 
the enactment of the first interstate com-
merce act which was designed to prevent 
railroads from practising price discrimina-
tion. This w.1s because discrimination was 
undermining the railroad's cartels. 14 Also, 
American Telephone and Telegraph 
pressed for state regulation of telephone 
services because it wanted to end competi-
tion among telephone companies. 1 ~ 
The image of government as a costless 
and reliable instrument for altering market 
behaviour has also been extensively ques-
tioned. 1° Cmts are incurred in the provi-
sion of data and information to regulators. 
It is also possible for regulation to reduce 
the reactivity and flexibility of companies 
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ulation could also affect management style. 
Management, for instance, may become 
more oriented towards satisfying the regu-
lators than towards meeting its proper 
business demands and objectivcs. 1 ~ Based 
on the above, it has been widely claimed 
that the costs of regulation are greater than 
any welfare losses arising from inefficiencies 
in market-based allocation of wealth. 
Empirical studies consequent to these 
contradictions in the public good theory 
show little evidence that government regu-
lation, especially in the form of state inter-
vention, is beneficial to the public. 1 'J If 
regulation could no longer be assumed to 
be implemented in the pursuit of efficiency 
objectives, then it becomes legitimate to 
inquire into its effective objective. 
Stigler, in a path-breaking article,2(' 
attempted an answer asserting that 'as a 
rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for 
its benefit'.21 This proposition has come to 
be known as the capture theory of regula-
tion?=' Bluntly put, the regulatory agencies 
are captured by the industry they are sup-
posed to be regulating. In other words, 
regulation, far from supporting the general 
public interest by achieving efficiency 
gains, is enacted and implemented in the 
interest of specialist producer groups. n 
Proponents of this theory argue that 
people in their political behaviour cannot 
be assumed to be motivated by fundamen-
tally different forces than in their private 
choice-making bcha vi our. Self-interest is 
usually put above all other intcrests. 24 The 
industry which seeks regulation must be 
prepared to pay with two things a political 
party needs: votes and resources. In non-
democratic societies the price can some-
times, be remarkably less: personal friend-
ships with the junta members or family 
relationships can be very useful.2 ~ In gen-
eral, people simply pursue their objectives, 
whatever they are, using the resources 
available to them. Persuading a customer 
to utilise one's services will no doubt pro-
duce a payoff, but so also can getting the 
government to impose some form of tariff 
on your competitors or to grant subsidies. 
The choice, therefore, between market and 
political action is essentially an economic 
one and will depend upon the relative costs 
involved and the chances of success in each 
case.2(' It was this trend towards analysing 
the usc of political processes from an eco-
nomic perspective, rather than implicitly 
assuming that they are infallible mechan-
isms for the production of the 'public 
good'27 that led to the reappraisal of gov-
ernment regulation. 
Regulation imposed on the grounds of 
public interest may sometimes end up ser-
ving the interest of the regulated group. 
An example of this can be found in the 
regulation of the tobacco industry in the 
USA (The Prohibition of Adverti>ing Act 
of 1971). It has been argued that it was the 
industry, not the consumers, that benefited 
from this act which banned cigarette 
advertising in the broadcasting mcdia. 2H 
Such benefits arose mainly because of the 
following factors: 
the ban on such advertising made the 
fairness doctrine inapplicable29 
the industry saved money after the ban 
because it reduced 1tS ad vcrtising 
expenditures 
industry sales increased significantly 
after the ban 
it helped the then ex1stmg local firms 
perpetuate their control of the national 
market. This was so because the ban on 
advertising made it difficult for new 
firms to enter the market:''' 
Public and private interests, it has also been 
argued, are entwined. For instance, it has 
been suggested that the best way to act in 
the interest of the public is by putting 
' . . £: "l\ ones pnvate mterest urst.-
Page 69 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The theory of regulatton A rev1ew arttcle 
It is also the shifting concept and varied 
interpretations of 'public good' that have 
enabled the use of regulation to shield 
major players in some industries from 
public scrutiny and indeed to prevent com-
petition in some."12 Regulation therefore 
serves different purposes for different inter-
d ·cc: . 11 est groups on werent occasiOns.·· 
Because of the ever-shifting perception 
of 'public good', shifting individual and 
group interests and perhaps the entwinc-
ment of public and individual good, 
neither the capture theory nor the public 
good theory has yet fully explained the 
rationale for regulation. 14 Interest groups 
and accidents also impact on the method of 
regulation employed. 
TYPES OF REGULATION 
There are, in the main, two types of regu-
lation: government regulation and self-reg-
ulation. Government regulations are 
sometimes administered through govern-
ment parastatals or agencies. Such regula-
tions are usually backed by statute laws 
established by acts of parliament or mili-
tary decrees. They are, therefore, rules 
which are intended, in all stages of their 
application, to be interpreted and enforced 
by the courts. Such Ia ws usually prescribe 
punishments for non-compliance. The 
power of statutes therefore lies in the gen-
eral willingness of society to obey the law 
and in the w·illingness of the state to 
enforce the punishment for non-compli-
ance.'~ Government regulation in some 
activities may however be advisable. This 
is especially so in the arena of social rcgula-
tiony, where externalities arc widespread. 
An example is the case of pollution. In 
such a case a statute-backed regulatory 
regime may reduce both the information 
and enforcement costs.J7 Regulation by a 
third party, unlike self-regulation, also has 
the advantage of ensuring the maintenance 
of the separation of power doctrine."1s This 
is so since it ensures the separation of the 
function of adjudication and enforcement 
of rules from the regulated industry. "l<J 
Government regulation is, however, not 
without its problems. Statute laws, for 
instance, are usually content with the pro-
vision of minimum standards. 411 This may 
be an incentive to companies just to adhere 
to the minimum standards. Another pro-
blem with statute laws is the fact that the 
very nature and power of the law make its 
change a serious matter, not to be underta-
ken frequently. Such laws therefore tend to 
be slow to he adapted to new develop-
ments and ch.mging circumstances. Finally, 
an inherent feature of statute law is that it 
tends to be its letter not its spirit that the 
courts interpret and enforce. For the above 
reasons, statute law, particularly where it 
relates to the administration of regulation, 
is sometimes framed in a manner which 
gives some degree of discretionary author-
ity to the regulator. 41 It is the above diffi-
culties that make self-regulation attractive 
to some parties. 
According to the National Consumer 
Council in the UK (NCC), self-regulation 
means that: 
'rules which govern behaviour in the 
market arc developed, administered and 
enforced bv the people (or their direct 
reprcsentati ves) whose behaviour is to be 
d' 42 governe . 
The extent to which these people control 
these rules can in fact vary considerabl/·' 
mainly because of a lack of a homogene-
ity in the interests of the forces that drive 
self-regulation. Typically, the debate over 
the setting up of self-regulatory schemes 
does not address constitutional issucs. 44 
Self-regulation, instead, usually arises out 
of two main circumstances: to repel the 
threat of government-imposed regula-
tion 45 or to curtail the activities of fringe 
operators and protect industry reputa-
. -16 
tiOn. 
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The benefits of a self-regulatory scheme 
could be immense. For instance, by redu-
cing reliance on statutes, self-regulatory 
schemes generally offer a speedier and 
more flexible means of solving problems.47 
Also, by utilising the skills of those 
involved in the business, self-regulation 
schemes may be able to overcome the 
information problems sometimes faced by 
government regulatory bodies, and stan-
dards can conceivably be set higher than in 
a statutory scheme. 4H Finally, the costs of 
self-regulatory regimes are normally inter-
nalised in the trade or activitv which is 
d I 
. ~ . 
expose to regu ation. 
Perhaps because of the variety of inter-
ests that impact on self-regulation, in prac-
tice it has not been without blemish and 
some schemes have found it difficult to 
meet some of the guidelines aimed at 
enhancing the credibility of self-regula-
tion. 511 Criticisms of such schemes include 
the fact that such schemes do not necessa-
rily cover all the firms in the industry." 1 
The negotiation and bargaining necessary 
to introduce a self-regulation scheme, in 
some cases, also take place without an 
input from third parties. 52 Finally, it has 
been claimed that self-regulation schemes 
have a poor record of enforcing their stan-
dards against disobedient members. 53 
Apart from all the above disadvantages, 
self-regulation is not always possible. For 
instance, the industry concerned may be 
too diverse, making it impossible for the 
level of agreement necessary for such regu-
lation to be obtained. An example is the 
Estate Agency Industry in Great Britain, 
where the Office of Fair Trading had for a 
long time encouraged the industry to take 
voluntary regulatory measures but with 
little success until the formation of the 
Ombudsman for Corporate Estate Agents, 
which still covered only half of the indus-
try. This led to the enactment of the Estate 
Agents (Provision of Information) Regula-
tions, 1991, by the Government."-+ In gen-
eral, the greater the external consequences 
of an industrial practice, the less acceptable 
self-regulation becomes. An example can 
be found in the banking industry. 
THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE 
BANKING INDUSTRY 
The b:mking industry is special in terms of 
regulation as experience has shown that 
failure (bankruptcy) in this industry has 
external consequences?' The concern to 
safeguard the viability of the depositary 
industry arose from the fact that financial 
failure had significant external effects that 
reached beyond the depositors and stock-
holders of the financial firm."(' The deposi-
tary institution played an important role as 
the chief conduit in both the payment pro-
cess and the savings and investment pro-
cess. Failure of individual firms in the 
depositary industry may lead to widespread 
deposit runs that could overflow to other 
depositary firms. S? This has come to be 
known as the contagion eftcct. 5K 
Institutional developments like the rise in 
interbank lending and various money 
market operations, propelled mainlv by the 
spirit of competition with the aid of 
advancements in information technology, 
have also added to the contagion problem. 
There has therefore been a steady rise in the 
entwinement of banks not just with their 
customers, but also with other banb. There-
fore, no matter how small a financial institu-
tion may be, the impact of its failure may be 
far-reaching for the entire fmancial system.5'J 
The danger of contagion is particularly 
acute for the banking system. If a cement 
manufacturer, for instance, fails, the ill 
effects are likely to be felt most by those 
who have had dealings with the institution. 
The repercussions for the industry and the 
general economy as a whole will tend to 
be much less serious. In fact, the l:ompeti-
tors may inherit some of their late rival's 
market share. The above scenario can of 
course occur in an isolated bank failure 
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especially when the reason for the failure 
can be clearly seen to be specific to the 
bank or a group of banks. In certain cir-
cumstances, however, the collapse of a 
bank could, in the absence of any official 
action, lead to loss of conf1dencc in the 
entire banking system and a subsequent 
mass withdrawal of depositors' funds from 
the system. In such a scenario, therefore, 
formal disclosure requirements are likely to 
be of little practical assistance. Irrespective 
of the bank's balance sheet strength, it may 
still be rendered insolvent by the actions of 
h d 
. (,1\ 
ot er epos1tors. 
The increased integration of the financial 
system, which has resulted in the rise in 
interbank dealings, has also increased the 
prospects of contagion should one bank 
fail. Therefore, when the banking system 
cooperates to save a distressed member, it 
is more an act of self-preservation than an 
act of charity. It is mainly on the above 
basis that it has been possible to secure the 
cooperation of the banking community in 
times of stress. For instance, during the 
1973 secondary banking crisis in Britain, 
large sums of money flowed out from the 
secondary banks to the clearing banks. 
These funds were recycled back to the sec-
ondary banks through the famous 'lifeboat 
. '(JI operation . 
It is thus clear that it is the problem of 
contagion that is the reason for preventing 
those who do not meet the minimum 
requirement necessary to achieve the status 
of a bank or licensed deposit taker from 
taking deposits. If the problem of conta-
gion did not exist, there might be a case 
for confining regulatory action to only 
'club members' without going on formally 
to bar non-'club members'r,2 from carrying 
d . b . (,) on epos1tary usmesses. · 
But not all ailing banks have been saved 
in the past. Between 1933 and 1982, 620 
banks failed in the USA alone. 64 The size 
of a distressed bank, no doubt, plays a 
major role in determining whether it gets 
helped. r,5 In some developing countries, 
this may create problems. For instance, 
new indigenous banking businesses are 
likely to be small with perhaps insignificant 
effect on the financial system should such 
banks collapse. Such banks will therefore 
be unlikely candidates for assistance under 
the above regime. It is perhaps because of 
this that the protection of infant industries 
has become a reason for government inter-
vention in banking (and other businesses) 
in some countries_c,r, Size alone, however, is 
not the only explanatory factor in the 
theory of which distressed bank gets assis-
tance.r,7 Other factors, no doubt, are 
usually part of the explanatory variables. 
The desire by some countries to limit or 
preclude foreign participation in a sector 
which is regarded as vital to the proper 
functioning of the national economy and 
the attainment of national policy objectives 
is yet another reason for government inter-
vention Ill banking.1'H This ts usually 
entwined with the typical infant industry 
argument. ul It was in this respect that the 
Reserve Bank of Australia cautioned that: 
'Banking is a key sector of the economy 
providing the community with money 
balances and payments arrangements. 
Control of ownership of banks should 
therefore he maintained in Australian 
hands to ensure concern for the national 
interest. Foreign banks may be inclined 
to give prior place to commercial 
advantage or to another country's 
national interest' .711 
The protection of depositors is yet another 
objective of bank regulation. Subsequent 
to the financial crisis of 1929-1933, bank-
ing regulators around the world empha-
sised this objective. Such an emphasis drew 
its strength from the political and social 
trends evident in many countries towards 
the protection of customers and away from 
the principle of caveat emptor. 71 There is 
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usually a case for deviating from the caveat 
emptor principle in certain industries. This is 
especially so where it is inherently difficult 
for the individual or consumer to as-;ess the 
goods or services he or she is buying or 
where the learning process for society may 
be judged too cost! y or difficult. 
The fact that an institution is supervised 
may be taken perhaps inappropriately, to 
mean that they have been given an official 
seal of approval. It is as a consequence of 
this that it may be argued that the supervi-
sory authorities carry some responsibility 
towards the members of the public. The 
belief may also grow up that either the 
authorities will not allow the institutions to 
fail or, where they fail, depositors will be 
compensated.7~ 
Many countries have deposit protection 
schemes in operation. In the UK, the 
deposit protection board provides protec-
tion for only 75 per cent of deposits for 
total deposits of up to £20,000. In the 
USA, where the bank failures of the 1930s 
proved a more traumatic experience, 
depositors have a better deal: deposits of up 
to US$100,000 are protected in full. 73 The 
limits on the protection of depositors in the 
UK implicitly assumed that even the small 
man should not be fully compensated for 
losses due to mismanagement. If a deposi-
tor can earn a higher return by placing 
funds with somewhat higher risks, full 
compensation may be an undue incentive 
to continue doing so as the depositor will 
be earning higher returns while the risks 
arc borne by another party.74 
Banking regulation docs not, however, 
only aim at preventing banking failures. 
Banks may also be regulated to ensure that 
they carry out their activities in accordance 
with the wider economic and social objec-
tives of the country. For instance, it is not 
unusual for banks, especially in developing 
countries to be given credit policy guide-
lines especially on the sectoral allocation of 
loans, either by government or the central 
bank. Banks have also been instructed by 
the government to avoid investments in 
certain sectors of the economy. either by 
direct ban or by making it unprofitable for 
them to do so. 
Another reason for regulating the finan-
cial system stems from the need to foster 
the efficiency and integrity of the market 
by minimising the problems that may arise 
from conflicts of interest on the part of 
market participants. Here, there are various 
ways of ensuring that conflicts of interest 
do not arise and, where they do, that they 
do not impact on the integrity of the 
market.7s In Britain, at least before the Big 
Bang in 1986, the brokering function was 
separated from the jobbing function. 7(' In 
other words, stockbrokers could only act as 
agents to their clients and jobbers could 
not deal directly with the investing 
public. 77 The early bank charters in the 
USA also enshrined the separation princi-
pk. By 1930, however, such a separation 
system had been abandoned in the USA 
and commercial banks had become the 
dominant force in the distribution and 
underwriting of securities.7K Whether the 
banking crisis of the early 1930s wa-; a con-
sequence of the abandonment of the 
separation principle has remained a conten-
tious issue among scholars and banking 
practitioners alike,79 although the advent of 
the Glass Steagall Act implicitly endorsed 
such a view. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to examine 
the various theoretical issues in regulation 
with a view to enhancing understanding of 
the regulation arena. Special emphasis has 
been placed on the banking industry. The 
paper shows how regulation serve-; differ-
ent purposes for different interest groups 
on different occas1ons. Furthermore, it 
argues that because of the ever-shifting 
concept of 'public good', shifting indivi-
dual and group interest and perhaps the 
Page 73 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The theory of regulation A rev1ew art1cle 
cntwinement of individual and public 
good, neither the capture theory or the 
public good theory has yet fully explained 
the rationale for regulation. A clear under-
standing of the theoretical issues involved 
in regulation is therefore important if the 
forces that drive regulation arc to be fully 
appreciated. 
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both cigarette commercials and the anti-
smoking messages that were so prevalent 
before the broadcasting ban' (Doron, 
1979, p. 89). 
(29) According to the American Cancer 
Society, 'While this law [The Prohibition 
of Advertising Act] was hailed as a vic-
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(51) Those who have not agreed to follow 
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(58) Justifying its support operations during 
the fringe-banking crisis of 1973, the 
Bank of England argued that it found 
itself 'confronted with the imminent col-
lapse of several deposit-taking institutions, 
and with the clear danger of a rapidly 
escalating crisis of confidence. This threa-
tened other deposit-taking institutions 
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domestic effects of any run ~ indeed the 
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well as fnr the Bank. The problem was to 
avoid a widening circle of collapse 
through the contagion of fear'. (Bank of 
England (1978a) 'The secondary banking 
crisis and the Bank of England's support 
operations', Bank of Englm1d Quarterly Bul-
letin, Vol. 18, p. 233.) 
(59) In line with this, the 1985 Annual Report 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, commented as follows 'The inter-
connections among institutions and mar-
kets in the new environment get more 
and more complex. A shock that starts in 
one market may spread quickly along this 
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seemingly unrelated place. In fact there is 
a growmg tendency to build financial 
links along regulatory fault lines where 
the responsibility for supervisory over-
sight is weak, divided or clouded' (p. 26). 
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committee, required the following condi-
tions to be satisfied before support was 
provided: (1) that the company seeking 
support was currently trading solvently 
and was likely to remain solvent provided 
it received liquidity support by way of 
recycled deposits; (2) that the company 
exhibited suffiCient banking characteristics 
to justify inclusion in the scheme (the pos-
session of a s.123 certificate, for instance) 
and had attracted a significant level of 
deposits from the public; and (3) that the 
company did not possess any institutional 
shareholders whose interest in the com-
pany was such that they might properly 
be expected to provide the necessary sup-
port (Bank of England (1978a) op. cit., ref. 
58, p. 233). 
(68) Reserve Bank of Australia (1979) 'Sub-
mission to the Committee of lnqlllry into 
the Australian Financial System', Reserve 
Bank of Australia, Sydney, Ch. 12. 
(69) It is usually argued that it is nece"ary to 
offer some form of protection to indigen-
ous companies. Such protectton IS 
required in order to protect them from 
the usually better-equipped foreign com-
panics. This is necessary tor the 'urvival 
and constrained development of indigen-
ous companies (United Nations Centre 
for Trans National Corporations 
(UNCTC, 1981) 'Transnational banks: 
Operations, strategies and their effects on 
developing countries', United Nations, 
New York. 
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(73) Ibid. 
(74) A pos,ible solution to the problem is to 
allow privately run insurance schemes to 
cater for the protection of the depositors. 
But this has its own problems: the possibi-
lity of a claim does not only depend on 
systematic risks but also on unsy-;tematic 
risks. The incentive, on the part of man-
agement, to behave with due care may be 
reduced if deposit insurance can be pur-
chased. Private insurers may tackle this 
problem by varying the premium rates 
depending on the riskiness of the deposit 
taker (ibid.). 
(7S) Fund management and bond issuing, for 
instance, involve potential conflicts of 
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interest, yet UK banks perform both 
activitie~ and arc able to maintain the con-
fidence of their clients by ensuring that a 
Chinese wall of silence exists between the 
different activities. An alternative way of 
maintaining market integrity is to ensure 
full disclosure of the activities of the 
market. This will enable customers to 
check that they arc getting the going 
prices. The best approach to adopt is open 
to argument. For instance, it could be 
argued that the abolition of a single capa-
city could lead, through agglomeration, 
to substantial economies of scale. On the 
other hand, the in formation required to 
make the disclosure system work could be 
very expensive both to produce and con-
sume (ibid, p.47). 
(76) As a result of the Big Bang, jobbers were 
replaced by market makers. 
(77) The aboYc regulations changed in 1986. 
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can, for instance, deal directly with inves-
tors (buying and selling securities from 
their own books), or act as agents, putting 
deals together f(Jt clients on commission 
basis. There are however rules in place to 
ensure that investors are not disadvan-
taged under this dual capacity system. See 
Bank of England (1 985). 'Developments 
in UK banking and monetary statistics 
since the Radcliffe Report', Bank of Eng-
land Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 25. pp. 392-
396. 
(78) Sec Dale (1992) op. Lit., Ch. 2, for an ana-
lysis of c'Vents leading to this abandon-
ment. 
(79) Sec also Dale (1992) op. cit., Ch. 2, for a 
review of the debate. 
